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Since the early 1980s, financial innovations
have benefited the United States by increasing the
availability of financing for new firms and improv-
ing Americans’ access to financial investments.
Some innovations, such as the development of the
venture capital market, arose from deregulation
and efforts to find new ways of financing small
firms, whose risk profiles made traditional finan-
cial sources less appropriate. By making capital
more available, these financial-side innovations
have enabled such firms to take advantage of
new technologies by developing new products.
Other changes have stemmed from better
information technology that has cut the costs of
investing. In particular, lower mutual fund loads
have made it feasible for many households to
own diversified stock and bond portfolios. Partly
as a result, the share of U.S. households owning
stock has risen from less than 25 percent in the
early 1960s to about 50 percent by the late
1990s. In these ways, borrowers’ and investors’
access to capital markets has increased, and this
democratization of America’s capital markets
helped fuel the economic boom of the 1990s,
the longest economic expansion on record.
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SMALL FIRMS’ 
ACCESS TO CAPITAL
The ability of firms to finance start-ups and
expansions has greatly improved. Traditionally,
entrepreneurs financed a start-up from their sav-
ings or from capital provided by a few wealthy in-
vestors. After establishing a track record, a suc-
cessful start-up could borrow from banks and, with
further success, issue stocks and bonds to fund
investments. The very best could even issue com-
mercial paper to fund working capital (Prowse
1996). These traditional patterns have changed
since the late 1970s owing to the rise of the high-
yield, or “junk,” bond market and of venture
capital.
The High-Yield Bond Market
Before the 1980s, only large, well-estab-
lished corporations issued bonds, typically bought
by large institutional investors (for example,
pension funds and life insurance companies)
that were primarily interested in bonds from the
most reputable and solid companies. Indeed,
many institutional investors face legal or fiduciary
constraints on whether and how much they can
invest in below-investment-grade bonds. Mid-
sized firms generally were seen as having below-
investment-grade credentials. Many bond in-
vestors viewed them as lacking creditworthiness
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and difficult to collect and analyze. Also, below-
investment-grade, or junk, bonds lacked a track
record with which to assess their risk. Many
low-grade bonds in that era were issued by
firms whose credit ratings subsequently fell be-
cause of unexpected bad outcomes. As a result,
to fund investments, a mid-sized firm usually
borrowed from one bank, which, as the only
longer-term creditor, could spread out the fixed
costs of monitoring all the debt issued to the
firm, thus keeping the financing costs down.
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In the 1980s, three factors enabled mid-
sized firms to issue bonds and shift away from
bank loans. One was the development of the
high-yield bond market fostered by a few pio-
neering investment banks that invested heavily
in new junk issues from a select group of mid-
sized firms (Loeys 1986). Prior to this, most junk
bonds reflected the downgrading of bonds that
had been investment-grade when issued. As the
market gained experience with new junk issues,
their risks became better known and the bonds
became more acceptable to investors.
A second factor was a surge in mergers
financed with bonds (leveraged buyouts or LBOs).
This rise stemmed from fewer regulatory bar-
riers to mergers, a greater need for consolida-
tion among domestic firms because of more
globalized markets, and improved economies of
scale in back-office operations from lower com-
puting costs. Corporate governance also shifted
as investors increasingly demanded that firms
cut costs and unlock value by divesting noncore
lines of business. The growing demand for merger
financing spilled over into the junk bond mar-
ket because most merger-related issues had large
debt payments relative to the acquiring firm’s
cash flow. In turn, the increase in the junk mar-
ket’s potential size spurred financial firms to
expand their capacity to issue and market junk
debt. As a result, the merger wave of the 1980s
created a deepening of this market (Loeys 1986
and Becketti 1990, p. 49).
A third boost to junk bonds came from
improved technology and analytical tools that
help investors obtain information about mid-
sized firms and buy bonds at a lower cost. As a
result, information and transaction costs were
lowered, fostering junk bond issuance during
the economic expansion of the 1980s (Loeys
1986, p.11).
In the 1990s expansion, junk bond financ-
ing of mergers fell out of favor for two reasons.
First, many LBO bonds ran into trouble during
the 1990–91 recession. Second, the 1990s stock
market boom enabled firms to use stock instead
of debt to finance mergers. Nevertheless, the
other factors behind the earlier growth of the junk
bond market remained. In addition, starting in
the early 1990s, Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 144a allowed firms to file a pre-
registration form that enabled them to quickly
issue privately placed bonds (typically bought
by large investors) without the usual registration
and disclosure delays of traditional bond regis-
tration. As noted by Fenn (2000), although
many firms subsequently register 144a bonds,
they avoid the cost and uncertainty of delaying
bond issuance. He also points out that many
higher risk firms find Rule 144a issuance attrac-
tive not only to avoid delays but also because
many of them could not meet the registration
requirements of traditionally issued bonds.
Issuance of 144a bonds surged in the late 1990s
(Figure 1), especially for below-investment-grade
firms for whom issuance delays can be costly.
The Rise of Venture Capital
Firms’ ability to raise start-up funding has
improved greatly since the late 1970s (Figure 2).
One reason is the impact of regulatory changes
allowing pension funds and other institutions to
make venture capital investments through limited
liability partnerships, which overcome impor-
tant hurdles to providing capital to new firms.
The development of the Nasdaq stock market
also aided venture capital by making it easier
for firms to issue stock. In addition, new infor-
mation technologies have opened up many
opportunities for creating new products.
Limited Liability Partnerships, IPOs, and the
Nasdaq. Before the 1980s it was extremely diffi-
cult for institutional investors to fund start-ups.
Pension funds were limited by legal and fidu-
Figure 1
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ciary constraints to investing in only investment-
grade bonds and in stocks of well-established
corporations. Other investors faced information-
related hurdles such as imperfect information
about how a new firm will fair. Will the firm use
start-up funding poorly, or take desperate gam-
bles if it encounters trouble, or even defraud
investors? Gathering information on such ques-
tions is expensive. To recoup these fixed costs,
an investor must either demand a high return
that the firm may be unable to pay or take a big
stake in that firm that limits the ability to diver-
sify against firm-specific risk. For these reasons,
outside seed capital came mainly from small
groups of wealthy individuals who often shared
information with one another.
Even if entrepreneurs surmounted this
limited base for start-up capital, their options for
financing working capital or new investments
were largely limited to internal cash flow, trade
credit, and bank loans. A bank, in contrast to
many securities investors, can spread the fixed
costs of monitoring and evaluating a firm over a
larger amount of debt. This enables the bank to
charge an affordable loan rate and monitor and
limit the firm’s risk-taking.
The ability of banks to perform this dele-
gated monitor role was impaired during the
1970s, when high inflation pushed market in-
terest rates above deposit rate ceilings. In re-
sponse, households withdrew bank deposits to
invest in market securities, and banks had to
curtail lending. Particularly hard hit were smaller
firms, which, unlike large companies, lacked the
reputation needed to issue bonds or commercial
paper. Between this rationing of bank credit and
the limited base for seed capital, a lack of financ-
ing became a major impediment to small busi-
ness formation. This spurred a series of deregu-
latory moves, including one allowing institutional
investors to form partnerships that could invest
in several start-up firms and receive the benefits
of being delegated monitors.
These limited liability partnerships (LLPs)
are joint ventures of several investors who pick
a management team to select which start-ups to
finance and monitor. The LLP reaps the cost
advantage of a delegated monitor and the diver-
sification gains to investing in a pool of start-
ups. To encourage good performance, LLPs give
managers a share in the profits. LLPs also dis-
courage managers from taking excessive risk
with others’ capital by restricting their invest-
ment choices and by overseeing them through a
board of directors. Other incentives for man-
agement include a limited lifetime of the LLP
and the potential to manage future LLPs once a
good reputation is established.
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When an LLP ends, it redeems the equity
in its venture investments. This equity value is
enhanced if the firms successfully conduct initial
public offerings (IPOs) of stock. The reason is
that traded equity can be held by more investors
and has more liquidity than private equity. The
development of the Nasdaq in the early 1970s
improved the prospects for IPOs. The require-
ments for a firm’s shares to be traded are gen-
erally easier on the Nasdaq than on the New
York (NYSE) and American (AMEX) stock ex-
changes. In addition, unlike these exchanges,
the Nasdaq is all-electronic, which lowers the
transaction costs of buying and selling smaller
batches of shares in newer or smaller companies.
As the Nasdaq made it easier and less costly for
firms to arrange IPOs through investment
banks, venture capital investing saw boosted
returns and volumes in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Role of New Nonfinancial Products. In
addition to the above innovations, which have
primarily expanded the supply of venture capi-
tal, nonfinancial innovations have increased the
demand for venture capital and, indirectly, its
supply. Advances in computer technology have
generated an array of information-related prod-
ucts. Indeed, most of the venture capital surge
in the late 1990s was concentrated in sectors
that used information innovations to spawn new
firms making new types of products (Figure 3).
Communications is an example of an
industry in which technological progress and
deregulation launched new firms. Likewise, the
service sector is more open to new entrants,
because the Internet facilitated the creation of
new business service, retailing and consumer-
related service firms (Figure 3). Computer advances
Figure 2
Venture Capital Disbursements, 1978–97
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and the increased availability of venture capital
have also spawned new biotechnology firms. In
other industries, information advances created
fewer opportunities for new firms. For instance,
there is little venture capital financing of Old
Economy product firms, as shown in Figure 3.
Within the high-tech sector, the volume of
venture capital deals for software and network-
ing firms has surged, while that for other types
of computer firms has been relatively flat. This
dichotomy fits with the general pattern of strong
venture capital growth in new industries and
less growth in industries dominated by estab-
lished firms.
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF HOUSEHOLD
INVESTORS’ ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS
Between the mid-1970s and late 1990s,
household portfolios changed greatly as the
share of household financial assets in bank
deposits fell, while that in mutual funds and
securities jumped from 22 percent in 1975 to 42
percent in 1999. To a large extent, this shift
stemmed from several innovations that lowered
the cost of investing and broadened the menu
of investments. These include the rise of money
market mutual funds, the advent of Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), and declines in
transaction costs.
The Rise of Money Funds and 
Money Market Deposit Accounts
In the early post-World War II era, there
were regulatory ceilings on bank deposit rates.
In periods of high inflation and high market
interest rates, these ceilings were binding and
many households earned below market interest
rates on deposits. As high market interest rates
became more persistent in the 1970s, some
households withdrew their funds from banks and
bought Treasury securities. With loanable funds
shrinking, banks restricted lending and encour-
aged their larger, more established commercial
borrowers to issue commercial paper backed by
bank lines of credit.
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In response, some mutual funds invested
in short-term securities (mainly Treasury bills
and commercial paper) and offered households
mutual fund shares with constant prices but
yielding market interest rates and featuring lim-
ited checking. In the high-interest period of the
late 1970s and early 1980s, these money market
mutual funds grew rapidly, while banks and
thrifts saw large deposit outflows. This led reg-
ulators to allow depositories to offer a new
instrument—money market deposit accounts—
that, like money funds, offered market interest
rates and limited checking. Also, deposit rate
ceilings ended in the early 1980s (Mahoney et
al. 1987). These changes made it easier for
households to invest in short-term money mar-
ket instruments.
The Advent of Individual Retirement Accounts
Starting in the early 1980s, Americans were
able to deposit up to $2,000 annually in IRAs.
The annual investments were tax deductible
and the principal and earnings not taxed until
withdrawn, presumably during retirement,
when taxpayers would likely be in lower
income-tax brackets. Since the mid-1980s,
Congress has altered the eligibility and annual
contribution provisions of traditional IRAs and
has created new types of IRAs, such as the Roth
IRA. The ability to compound investment
returns tax-free until withdrawal for all types of
IRAs and the deductibility of initial investments
in traditional IRAs encouraged many wealthy
Americans to shift existing assets into tax-pre-
ferred IRA accounts.
The advent of IRAs had four important
effects. First, the eligibility requirements encour-
aged people to use third parties, such as mutual
funds, to manage IRA assets and induced many
families to shift from directly held stocks and
bonds to indirect holdings through mutual funds
(Figure 4 ). Second, the rise of defined-contri-
Figure 3
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bution pension plans encouraged many people
to incur the one-time costs of learning about
investing, which prompted many to shift their
nonretirement assets into mutual funds as well.
A third stimulus to non-IRA mutual fund assets
arose from the minimum balance requirements
of mutual funds, toward which both IRA and
non-IRA assets often count. Fourth, IRAs have
enabled many who switch jobs to accumulate
assets, whereas previously, job switchers lost
pension assets held in defined-benefit plans that
favored long-time employees.
Declines in Asset Transaction Costs
Declines in transaction costs have taken
three forms: falling mutual fund loads, declining
brokerage fees, and lower cost exchange-traded
funds.
The Falling Costs of Investing in Mutual Funds.
One of the more dramatic changes affecting
household portfolios is the large decline in
mutual fund costs, which may have spurred
many middle-income families to begin invest-
ing in stocks. This possibility accords with the
impact of lower transaction costs in portfolio
choice models of Heaton and Lucas (2000) and
Saito (1995). In these dynamic optimization mod-
els, utility functions characterized by habit for-
mation imply that transaction costs can deter
many families from investing in stocks. These
papers tweak the conventional intertemporal
framework by assuming that people’s utility
reflects not the sum of how they value con-
sumption in separate periods but rather reflects
that they get used to a certain standard of living
from which they do not wish to deviate. Effec-
tively, this assumption of “habit formation”
makes near-term consumption more important
relative to future consumption. As a result, trans-
action costs affect portfolio decisions. In cali-
bration exercises, a decline in transaction costs
can induce a large rise in equity participation.
Theoretically, transaction fees have also been
shown in other models to be barriers to entry,
especially under uncertainty, as described by
Dixit (1989).
Because of their limited wealth, many
families are more apt to acquire a diversified
stock portfolio by buying mutual fund shares
rather than by directly buying stocks. For these
families, the relevant transaction costs for
investing in stocks are mutual fund fees, and if
these fees fall, stock ownership rates should
rise. This is consistent with Figure 5, which shows
large increases in overall stock ownership rates
accompanying large declines in equity mutual
fund costs (see Duca 2000 and 2001a).
4 In addi-
tion, detailed data reveal that most of the rise in
overall equity ownership occurred in indirect
forms and that indirect ownership is also nega-
tively correlated with equity fund loads. Further-
more, other data imply that the rise of indirect
ownership primarily occurred through increased
mutual fund ownership. The much higher fees
of the 1970s and early 1980s may thus account
for many households’ relatively greater resis-
tance to owning stocks before the late 1990s
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Figure 5
Equity Fund Loads Fall and 
Stock Ownership Rates Rise
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In a related study using nearly three
decades of time series data, Duca (2001b) finds
that lower mutual fund loads and greater confi-
dence in the future have boosted the relative
use of mutual funds as a way of owning equity.
He measures the relative reliance on mutual
funds with equity fund assets as a share of all
stocks owned by households. He argues that
lower fund fees spur some shareholders to shift
some assets from directly owned shares to
mutual funds. Also, the lower fees induce initial
stock ownership by households that are more
apt to hold shares in mutual funds for reasons
related to limited wealth and portfolio diversifi-
cation. Recent calibration models of and empir-
ical evidence on household portfolio behavior
together suggest that falling mutual fund costs
have boosted equity ownership rates in the
United States.
The Decreasing Costs of Trading Stocks.
Before 1974, the costs of trading stocks on the
NYSE were fixed to prevent price competition
among brokers. This placed small investors at a
disadvantage because there were discounts for
trades of large blocks of stock. Price competi-
tion was allowed for small trades on the NYSE
beginning in April 1974 and on all trades after
April 1975. These steps helped drive down 
brokerage costs. Although continuous data are
unavailable, partial data from Schaefer (1997, 
p. 13) show that broker fees fell just after dereg-
ulation. Since the early 1980s, the rise of dis-
count brokers has likely pushed costs down fur-
ther, giving investors the option of buying or
selling securities without professional advice.
The Internet has aided such low-cost investing
by partially substituting for broker services. In-
deed, some old-line brokerage firms now offer
the option of buying or selling stocks without a
broker. While traditional broker services are still
important, direct investors in stocks now can
choose from a menu of services.
One interesting nondevelopment is that the
proportion of American households that directly
own stock has not increased despite declines in
the fees of buying and selling stocks. One reason
is that the limited wealth of many Americans
does not permit them to easily buy and maintain
a diversified portfolio of directly held stocks. As
a result, declining fees have likely benefited
wealthy households.
The Advent of Exchange-Traded Funds. Since
December 1998, a new type of stock has traded
on the American Exchange. Exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) offer the diversification of index
mutual funds at a lower cost. The first ETF
duplicated the stocks in the S&P 500, thus the
name Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts, or
SPDRs. Mirroring the name abbreviation, shares
in this ETF are called spiders. Nine other S&P-
based ETFs (Select Sector SPDRs) have been
created that replicate the subcomponents of the
S&P 500.
6 Other ETFs now include World Equity
Benchmark Series (WEBS), which duplicate
indexes of foreign stocks, and Diamonds, which
are based on the Dow Jones industrial average.
How do ETFs compare with index mutual
funds? ETFs are continuously traded, unlike
mutual fund shares, which can be bought or
sold once a day. Like index mutual funds, ETFs
buy and sell securities to match changes in the
composition of the stock index they mirror. As
a result, they have low costs like index mutual
funds and are arguably a close substitute (for
further discussion, see Malkiel 2000).
While ETFs compete with index mutual
funds, a new investing service offers a substitute
for actively managed mutual funds. In particu-
lar, some web-based companies offer investors
customized stock portfolios at costs that, for
investments of at least $30,000, are purportedly
below the expenses of purchasing actively man-
aged mutual funds (McGeehan 2000). These
kinds of services, along with ETFs, broker inno-
vations, and the potential for further declines in
mutual fund costs, will likely continue to reduce
household investors’ transaction and asset man-
agement costs.
IMPLICATIONS
The increased openness, or democratiza-
tion, of U.S. capital markets means that house-
holds have a wider array of investment choices
and small businesses have more sources of capi-
tal. For example, more households can feasibly
invest in stocks, and more small firms have
access to venture capital. In addition, better
diversification in their investment menus offers
protection from disruptions in particular mar-
kets. This article focuses on two implications of
the democratization of U.S. capital markets: the
possible impact of more households being
exposed to stock market swings and the possi-
ble increased sensitivity of small and expanding
businesses to fluctuations in securities markets.
A Possible Rise in the Sensitivity of 
Consumption to Stock Wealth
According to many theoretical models, ris-
ing stock wealth boosts consumption by raising
the permanent or life-cycle income of house-
holds (see Ando and Modigliani 1963, and Fried-
man 1957). Stock market wealth has a role inFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 16
many econometric models of consumption based
on the permanent income and life-cycle hypothe-
ses (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 1999, Bosworth 1975, Brayton and
Tinsley 1996, and Mishkin 1977) and in models
deviating from the life-cycle hypothesis. One
example of the latter is Carroll’s (1992) buffer
stock model, in which utility-maximizing house-
holds alter their savings to hit a target wealth-to-
income ratio. This implication is consistent with
the recent fall in the personal savings rate and
jump in the wealth-to-income ratio (see Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2000 and Figure 6).
One concern about the importance of
stock market wealth is that stock ownership is
concentrated among the very rich, whose con-
sumption is probably not affected much by
swings in stock prices. Indeed, some studies
find that the savings behavior of the rich differs
greatly from that of the general populace
(Carroll 2000a, 2000b and Dynan, Skinner, and
Zeldes 2000). In particular, evidence reveals that
the rich save partly to acquire and preserve (pri-
marily through bequests) power and status
(Carroll 2000b). These concerns imply that the
stock market wealth effect will be very limited.
Nevertheless, rising stock ownership rates
suggest that an increasing share of households,
whose consumption is affected by wealth, is ex-
posed to the stock market. Unfortunately, equity
participation rate data are unavailable to directly
test whether stock market wealth effects have
become more important as stock ownership has
become more widespread. However, equity fund
loads appear to be a good instrument for equity
participation. (This is suggested by Figure 5.)
Taking this tack, Duca (2001a) adds the product
of loads and the log of stock wealth as a sepa-
rate variable to consumption regressions con-
taining standard wealth variables to test whether
loads affect the stock wealth elasticity of con-
sumption.
7 If such interactive terms have nega-
tive signs, this is evidence that falling loads boost
the impact of stock wealth on consumption by
inducing more of the population to own equi-
ties. Using this approach, Duca (2001a) finds
that the overall stock market wealth effect has
grown in magnitude as equity mutual fund costs
have fallen. His estimates indicate that a 100
percent rise in stock wealth is associated with a
3 percent increase in annual consumption in 
the late 1990s, up from about 1.5 percent in the
mid-1960s. He also finds that estimates of stock
market wealth coefficients vary less in rolling
regressions that account for the time-varying
effect of equity loads on wealth effects. As with
all relatively new research, readers should view
these results as providing some support for a
hypothesis rather than conclusive proof.
Is Small Business Finance More Sensitive to
Securities Market Fluctuations?
Evidence suggests that innovations have
increased the availability of financing for small
and expanding firms. This, however, makes
financing for such firms more subject to swings
in financial market conditions. For example, if
the venture capital market should dry up, small
or new business financing would contract. Even
in such a case, small firms might still be able to
borrow from banks, an option they had before
the advent of the venture capital market. For
this reason, while innovations could make the
volume of financing more sensitive to financial
market swings, they likely have boosted the
absolute levels of such financing.
How sensitive to financial markets is the
availability of financing for small or expanding
firms? From the short history of venture capital,
Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that when
stock market prices fall substantially, the IPO
market tends to shrink for a while, as it did in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In turn, the
decline in the near-term prospects of making a
successful IPO will likely reduce the expected
returns to investing in LLPs, which generally
have five- to ten-year lives. Consistent with this
hypothesis, Gompers and Lerner find that a
downturn in the IPO market is associated with
a decline in the volume of new venture capital
investments.
Figure 6
Wealth Gains Associated with a 
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As with the IPO and venture capital mar-
kets, there is evidence that riskier firms’ ability
to issue high-yield bonds is more sensitive to
financial market conditions than is that of better
established firms. Indeed, the spreads of junk
bond yields over Aaa-rated (the highest grade of
corporate bond) yields jumped much more than
did the spread between Baa- and Aaa-rated
bonds during the 1990-91 recession.
8 (Baa-rated
bonds are the lowest grade of investment-grade
bonds in which banks and most institutional
investors are able or willing to invest.) Mirroring
this jump in junk bond default spreads was a
relative rise in the default rates on junk versus
investment-grade bonds.
A decline in securities market conditions
can curtail the availability of high-yield bond or
venture capital financing for small and expand-
ing firms in two ways. Reduced expectations
about the future economy will push stock prices
and investment down even without any feed-
back between them. These effects are typically
more pronounced for less established firms
whose investment prospects are more sensitive
to risk. Also, a drop in stock prices may increase
investors’ risk aversion, which may especially
boost the premiums on riskier investments, such
as high-yield bonds, IPOs, and venture capital.
This feedback effect from a declining economic
outlook further reduces the availability of small
and start-up business credit. Banks, however,
may partly offset such effects by lending more
to the affected firms. In late 1998 and early
1999, financial market disruptions drove many
large and mid-sized firms away from the bond
and commercial paper markets to banks, where
they had lines of credit. While smaller firms
tend to have less access to such lines, some
would be able to borrow from banks, which,
during periods of high risk, can more closely
monitor new credit extensions than can open
markets.
However, banks would likely be less will-
ing to compensate for a dearth of financing for
start-up firms that lack credit and commercial
histories. In addition, the end of Regulation Q
has stabilized the availability of bank loans,
while credit scoring and other less expensive
ways of lending have helped banks lower their
costs to make small business loans. On balance,
the availability and stability of bank financing
have likely increased, while the long-run avail-
ability of volatile short-run sources of start-up
financing, such as venture capital, has also in-
creased. In general, the availability of financing
has risen for firms, but the nature of short-run
fluctuations in availability has changed.
CONCLUSION
In the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, deregulation and technological advances
spawned several financial changes that have
increased the access of small investors and firms
to U.S. capital markets. For households, these
innovations have widened investment choices,
particularly for stocks and nonbank interest-
bearing assets. For less established firms, these
changes first made junk bonds a viable source
of capital; later innovations made venture capi-
tal increasingly available. The benefits of this
democratization of America’s capital markets
have spurred other developed nations, particu-
larly in Europe, to bolster venture capital and
increase their citizens’ access to mutual funds
and other financial products.
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1 See Rosengren (1990) for more discussion of how the
rise of the junk bond market opened up the securities
markets as a source of finance for less established
corporations.
2 LLPs are one form of private, that is, nontraded, equity.
For a more complete discussion of the role of private
equity in funding new and existing firms, see Fenn,
Liang, and Prowse (1997, 1998) and Prowse (1998).
3 See Post (1992) for more on the evolution of the
commercial paper market.
4 Overall ownership includes directly owning individual
stocks and indirectly owning stocks through mutual
funds and other means. Ownership rates from the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) are not fully
consistent over time for three reasons. First, pre-1989
SCFs treat all mutual fund assets as indirectly owning
stock, but data since 1989 distinguish between bond
and equity funds. Second, Federal Reserve statistics
treat stock in IRA or 401(k) plans as indirect stock
ownership since 1989. Third, some early SCFs treat
privately held equity as owning stock, whereas later
SCFs do not. 1986 data are omitted because they
likely undercount broad stock ownership. This SCF
only asked a family if it owned stock or mutual funds,
whereas others also asked if households held stock in
their employer or in investment clubs. There are also
concerns about the quality of the 1986 SCF because 
it was done by phone, without edit checks of unusual
answers. In addition, because the 1986 SCF recon-
tacted 1983 respondents, the 1986 SCF could haveFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
been distorted by selection effects from movers.
Ownership rates are the most up-to-date data from
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000); Katona,
Lininger, and Mueller (1968); Katona et al. (1970);
Katona, Mandell, and Schmiedeskamp (1971); and
Durkin and Elliehausen (1978).
Equity fund load data are from Duca (2001b), who
constructs estimates of asset-weighted loads from a
sample of large equity mutual funds used by Duca
(2000). These estimates are based on data from the
funds, IBC/Donoghue, the Investment Company
Institute, and Morningstar. Duca’s cost estimates,
which span 1960–2000, move together with more
comprehensive industrywide cost estimates from Rea
and Reid (1998) that are available only since 1980.
5 Although Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) show that
investment minimums at mutual funds are too low to
explain why most households do not own equity, their
findings do not rule out the possibility that mutual fund
fees were an important barrier to more widespread
stock ownership. This possibility is consistent with the
findings of Heaton and Lucas (2000).
6 “Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts,” “SPDRs,”
and “Select Sector SPDRs” are trademarks of The
McGraw-Hill Companies.
7 This interactive load variable may also track a rise in
the liquidity of stock wealth. In particular, by reducing
the cost of going in and out of stocks, lower loads
could conceivably boost the magnitude of stock
wealth on consumption in the short run.
8 Aside from an increase in downside macroeconomic
risk, junk bond spreads were also probably boosted
by new regulations that forced many thrift institutions
to sell their substantial holdings of junk bonds. By
causing an inward shift of the demand for holding junk
bonds, these regulations conceivably pushed down
junk bond prices and thereby put upward pressure on
junk bond yields relative to other corporate yields.
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